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As recently pointed out by the Institute of Medicine, the existing pandemic mitigation models lack the dynamic decision support
capability. We develop a large-scale simulation-driven optimization model for generating dynamic predictive distribution of
vaccines and antivirals over a network of regional pandemic outbreaks. The model incorporates measures of morbidity, mortality,
and social distancing, translated into the cost of lost productivity and medical expenses. The performance of the strategy is
compared to that of the reactive myopic policy, using a sample outbreak in Fla, USA, with an aﬀected population of over four
millions. The comparison is implemented at diﬀerent levels of vaccine and antiviral availability and administration capacity.
Sensitivity analysis is performed to assess the impact of variability of some critical factors on policy performance. The model
is intended to support public health policy making for eﬀective distribution of limited mitigation resources.

1. Introduction
As of July 2010, WHO has reported 501 confirmed human
cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1) which resulted in 287
deaths worldwide [1]. At the same time, the statistics for the
H1N1 2009 outbreak has so far included 214 countries with
a total reported number of infections and deaths of 419,289
and 18,239, respectively [2]. Today, an ominous expectation
exists that the next pandemic will be triggered by a highly
pathogenic virus, to which there is little or no pre-existing
immunity in humans [3].
The nation’s ability to mitigate a pandemic influenza depends on the available emergency response resources and
infrastructure, and, at present, challenges abound. Predicting
the exact virus subtype remains a diﬃcult task, and even
when identified, reaching an adequate vaccine supply can
currently take up to nine months [4, 5]. Even if the existing vaccines prove to be potent, their availability will
be limited by high production and inventory costs [6, 7]
and also will be constrained by the supply of antiviral
drugs, healthcare providers, hospital beds, medical supplies,
and logistics. Hence, pandemic mitigation will have to be
done amidst limited availability of resources and supporting

infrastructure. This challenge has been acknowledged by
WHO [7] and echoed by the HHS and CDC [8, 9].
The existing models on pandemic influenza (PI) containment and mitigation aims to address various complex
aspects of the pandemic evolution process including: (i) the
mechanism of disease progression, from the initial contact
and infection transmission to the asymptomatic phase,
manifestation of symptoms, and the final health outcome
[10–12], (ii) the population dynamics, including individual
susceptibility [13, 14] and transmissibility [10, 15–17], and
behavioral factors aﬀecting infection generation and eﬀectiveness of interventions [18–20], (iii) the impact of pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical measures, including vaccination [21–23], antiviral therapy [24–26], social distancing
[27–31] and travel restrictions, and the use of low-cost
measures, such as face masks and hand washing [26, 32–34].
Recently, the modeling eﬀorts have focused on combining pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions in
search for synergistic strategies, aimed at better resource
utilization. Most of such approaches attempt implementing
a form of social distancing followed by application of
pharmaceutical measures. For significant contributions in
this area see [33, 35–41]. One of the most notable among
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these eﬀorts is a 2006-07 initiative by MIDAS [42], which
cross-examined independent simulation models of PI spread
in rural areas of Asia [43, 44], USA and UK [45, 46],
and the city of Chicago [47], respectively. MIDAS crossvalidated the models by simulating the city of Chicago,
with 8.6M inhabitants and implementing a targeted layered
containment [48, 49]. The research findings of MIDAS and
some other groups [12, 33] were used in a recent “Modeling
Community Containment for Pandemic Influenza” report
by IOM, to formulate a set of recommendations for PI
mitigation [50]. These findings were also used in a pandemic
preparedness guidance developed by CDC [51].
At the same time, The IOM report [50] points out several
limitations of the MIDAS models, observing that “because of
the significant constraints placed on the models . . . the scope
of models should be expanded.” The IOM recommends “to
adapt or develop decision-aid models that can . . . provide
real-time feedback . . . and include the costs and benefits
of intervention strategies.” Our literature review yields a
similar observation that most existing approaches focus on
assessment of a priori defined strategies, and virtually none
of the models are capable of “learning,” that is, adapting
to changes in the pandemic progress, or even predicting
them, to generate dynamic strategies. Such a strategy has the
advantage of being developed dynamically, as the pandemic
spreads, by selecting a mix of available mitigation options at
each decision epoch, based on both the present state of the
pandemic and its predicted evolution.
In an attempt to address the IOM recommendations,
we present a simulation optimization model for developing
predictive resource distribution over a network of regional
outbreaks. The underlying simulation model mimics the disease and population dynamics of each of the aﬀected regions
(Sections 2.1 and 2.2). As the pandemic spreads from region
to region, the optimization model distributes mitigation
resources, including stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral and
administration capacities (Section 2.3). The model seeks to
minimize the impact of ongoing outbreaks and the expected
impact of potential outbreaks, using measures of morbidity,
mortality, and social distancing, translated into the cost of
lost productivity and medical expenses. The methodology is
calibrated and implemented on a sample outbreak in Fla,
USA with over 4M inhabitants (Section 3). The strategy
is compared to the reactive myopic policy, which allocates
resources from one actual outbreak region to the next, each
time trying to cover the entire regional population at risk,
regardless of the resource availability. The comparison is
done at diﬀerent levels of vaccine and antiviral availability
and administration capacity. We also present a sensitivity
analysis for assessing the impact of variability of some critical
factors, including: (i) antiviral eﬃcacy, (ii) social distancing
conformance, and (iii) CDC response delay.

2. Methodology
The objective of our methodology is to generate a progressive
allocation of the total resource availability over a network
of regional outbreaks. The methodology incorporates (i) a
cross-regional simulation model, (ii) a set of single-region
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Figure 1: Schematic of cross-regional pandemic spread and
resource distribution.

simulation models, and (iii) an embedded optimization
model.
We consider a network of regions with each of which
classified as either unaﬀected, ongoing outbreak, or contained outbreak (Figure 1). The cross-regional simulation
model connects the regions by air and land travel. The
single-region simulation models mimic the population and
disease dynamics of each ongoing region, impacted by
intervention measures. The pandemic can spread from
ongoing to unaﬀected regions by infectious travelers who
pass through regional border control. At every new regional
outbreak epoch, the optimization model allocates available
resources to the new outbreak region (actual distribution)
and unaﬀected regions (virtual distribution). Daily statistics
is collected for each ongoing region, including the number
of infected, deceased, and quarantined cases, for diﬀerent age
groups. As a regional outbreak is contained, its societal and
economic costs are calculated.
In Sections 2.1–2.3, we present the details of the simulation and optimization models. A testbed illustration and a
comparison of our strategy to the myopic policy is given in
Section 3.
2.1. Cross-Regional Simulation Model. A schematic of the
cross-regional simulation model is shown in Figure 2. The
model is initialized by creating population entities and
mixing groups, for each region. A pandemic is started by an
infectious case injected into a randomly chosen region. The
details of the resulting regional contact dynamics and infection transmission are given in Section 2.2. As the infected
cases start seeking medical help, a new regional outbreak
is detected. A resource distribution is then determined and
returned to the single-region model. The outbreak can
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Figure 2: Schematic of cross-regional simulation model.

spread to unaﬀected regions as some infectious travelers
pass undetected through the border control. By tracing these
travelers, the model determines which of the unaﬀected
regions, if any, become new outbreaks. The model also
determines if any ongoing outbreaks have been contained.
The simulation stops when all outbreaks are contained.
2.2. Single-Region Simulation Model. The single-region
model subsumes the following components (see Figure 3):
(i) population dynamics (mixing groups and schedules), (ii)
contact and infection process, (iii) disease natural history,
and (iv) mitigation strategies, including social distancing,
vaccination, and antiviral application. The model collects
detailed statistics, including number of infected, recovered,
deceased, and quarantined cases, for diﬀerent age groups.
For a contained outbreak, its societal and economic costs are
calculated. The societal cost includes the cost of lost lifetime
productivity of the deceased; the economic cost includes the
cost of medical expenses of the recovered and deceased and
the cost of lost productivity of the quarantined [52].
2.2.1. Mixing Groups and Schedules. Each region is modeled
as a set of population centers formed by mixing groups or
places where individuals come into contact with each other
during the course of their social interaction. Examples of
mixing groups include households, oﬃces, schools, universities, shopping centers, entertainment centers, and so forth,
[53]. Each individual is assigned a set of attributes such as
age, gender, parenthood, workplace, infection susceptibility,
and probability of travel, among others. Each person is
also assigned Δt time-discrete (e.g., Δt = 1 hour) weekday
and weekend schedules, which depend on: (i) person’s age,
parenthood, and employment status, (ii) disease status,
(iii) travel status, and (iv) person’s compliance to social
distancing decrees [54]. As their schedules advance, the
individuals circulate throughout the mixing groups and
come into contact with each other (see Section 2.2.2).

It is assumed that at any point of time, an individual
belongs to one of the following compartments (see Figure 4):
susceptible, contacted (by an infectious individual), infected
(asymptomatic or symptomatic), and recovered/deceased.
In what follows, we present the infection transmission
and disease natural history model, which delineates the
transitions between the above compartments.
2.2.2. Contact and Infection Process. Infection transmission
occurs during contact events between susceptible and infectious cases, which take place in the mixing groups. At the
beginning of every Δt period (e.g., one hour), for each
mixing group g, the simulation tracks the total number of
infectious cases, ng , present in the group. It is assumed that
each infectious case generates rg per Δt unit of time new
contacts [46], chosen randomly (uniformly) from the pool
of susceptibles present in the group. We also assume the
following: (i) during Δt period, a susceptible may come into
contact with at most one infectious case and (ii) each contact
exposure lasts Δt units of time. Once a susceptible has started
her contact exposure at time t, she will develop infection at
time t + Δt with a certain probability that is calculated as
shown below.
Let Li (t) be a nonnegative continuous random variable
that represents the duration of contact exposure, starting
at time t, required for susceptible i to become infected. We
assume that Li (t) is distributed exponentially with mean
1/λi (t), where λi (t) represents the instantaneous force of
infection applied to susceptible i at time t [55–57]. The
probability that susceptible i, whose contact exposure has
started at time t, will develop infection at time t + Δt is then
given as
P {Li (t) ≤ Δt } = 1 − e−λi (t)Δt .

(1)

2.2.3. Disease Natural History. A schematic of the disease
natural history is shown in Figure 5. During the incubation

4

Influenza Research and Treatment
Begin single-region
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From 8:00 am–7:59 pm,
implement every Δt:

From 8:00 pm–7:59 am,
implement every Δt:

Contact process

Disease history

Infection process

Collect statistics

Check status of
social distancing

Disease history

Assign schedules

End single-region
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Figure 3: Schematic of single-region simulation model.

τ is the antiviral eﬃcacy measured as the relative decrease
in the base probability [44]. We assume that a recovered
case develops full immunity but continues circulating in the
region.

Recovered
Susceptible

Contacted

Infected
Deceased

Figure 4: Schematic of disease natural history.
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Figure 5: Schematic of disease natural history model.

phase, the infected case stays asymptomatic. At the end of the
latency phase, she enters the infectious phase [44, 46, 48]. She
becomes symptomatic at the end of the incubation period. At
the end of the infectious phase, she enters the period leading
to a health outcome, which culminates in her recovery or
death.
Mortality for influenza-like diseases is a complex process
aﬀected by many factors and variables, most of which have
limited accurate data support available from past pandemics.
Furthermore, the time of death can sometimes be weeks
following the disease episode (which is often attributable
to pneumonia-related complications [58]). Because of the
uncertainty underlying the mortality process, we adopted an
age-based form of the mortality probability of infected i, as
follows:




mi = μi 1 − τρi ,

(2)

where μi is the age-dependent base mortality probability of
infected i, ρi is her status of antiviral therapy (0 or 1), and

2.2.4. Mitigation Strategies. Mitigation options include pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions. Mitigation
is initiated upon detection of a critical number of confirmed
infected cases [59], which triggers resource distribution and
deployment. The model incorporates a certain delay for
deploying field responders.
Pharmaceutical intervention (PHI) includes vaccination
and antiviral application. Vaccination is targeted at individuals at risk [60] to reduce their infection susceptibility.
The vaccine takes a certain period to become eﬀective
[61]. Vaccination is constrained by the allocated stockpile
and administration capacity, measured in terms of the
immunizer-hours. We assume that as some symptomatic
cases seek medical help [62, 63], those at risk of them
will receive an antiviral. The process is constrained by the
allocated stockpile and administration capacity, measured in
terms of the number of certified providers.
Both vaccination and antiviral application are aﬀected by
a number of sociobehavioral factors, including conformance
of the target population, degree of risk perception, and compliance of healthcare personnel [64–66]. The conformance
level of the population at risk can be aﬀected, among other
factors, by the demographics and income level [67–71] as
well as by the quality of public information available [54].
The degree of risk perception can be influenced by the negative experience developed during previous pharmaceutical
campaigns [72, 73], as well as by public fear and rumors
[74, 75].
Nonpharmaceutical intervention (NPI) includes social
distancing and travel restrictions. We adopted a CDC
guidance [51], which establishes five categories of pandemic
severity and recommends quarantine and closure options
according to the category. The categories are determined
based on the value of the case fatality ratio (CFR), the
proportion of fatalities in the total infected population. For
CFR values lower than 0.1% (Category 1), voluntary at-home
isolation of infected cases is implemented. For CFR values
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between 0.1% and 1.0% (Categories 2 and 3), in addition to
at-home isolation, the following measures are recommended:
(i) voluntary quarantine of household members of infected
cases and (ii) child and adult social distancing. For CFR
values exceeding 1.0% (Categories 4 and 5), all the above
measures are implemented. As the eﬀectiveness of social
distancing is aﬀected by some of the behavioral factors
listed above [54], we assume a certain social distancing
conformance level. Travel restrictions considered in the
model included regional air and land border control for
infected travelers.
2.3. Optimization Model. As presented in Figure 2, the
optimization model is invoked at the beginning of every nth
new regional outbreak epoch (n = 1, 2, . . .), starting from the
initial outbreak region (n = 1). The objective of the model is
to allocate some of the available mitigation resources to the
new outbreak region (actual distribution) while reserving the
rest of the quantities for potential outbreak regions (virtual
distribution). By doing so, the model seeks to progressively
minimize the impact of ongoing outbreaks and the expected
impact of potential outbreaks, spreading from the ongoing
locations. Mitigation resources can include stockpiles of
vaccines and antivirals, administration capacity, hospital
beds, medical supplies, and social distancing enforcement
resources, among others. The predictive mechanism of the
optimization model is based on a set of regression equations
obtained using single-region simulation models. In what
follows, we present the construction of the optimization
model and explain the solution algorithm for the overall
simulation-based optimization methodology.
We introduce the following general terminology and
notation:
S : Set of all network regions
An : Set of regions in which pandemic is contained at the
nth outbreak epoch (n = 1, 2, . . .)
n
B : Set of ongoing regions at the nth outbreak epoch
C n : Set of unaﬀected regions at the nth outbreak epoch
R : Set of available types of mitigation resources (R =
{1, 2, . . . , r })
qik : Amount of resource i allocated to region k
Qin : Available amount of resource i ∈ R at the nth
outbreak epoch
H : Set of age groups.
The optimization criterion (objective function) of the model
incorporates measures of expected societal and economic
costs of the pandemic: the societal cost includes the cost of
lost lifetime productivity of the deceased; the economic cost
includes the cost of medical expenses of the recovered and
deceased and the cost of lost productivity of the quarantined.
To compute these costs, the following impact measures of
morbidity, mortality, and quarantine are used, for each
region k:
Xhk : Total number of infected cases in age group h who
seek medical assistance
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Yhk : Total number of infected cases in age group h who
do not seek medical assistance
Dhk : Total number of deceased cases in age group h
Vhk : Total number of person-days of cases in age group h
who comply with quarantine.
To estimate these measures, we use the following regression
models obtained using a single-region simulation of each
region k:
0
+
Xhk = δhk



i
δhk
· qik +

i∈R


i,m∈R, i =
/m

im
δhk
· qik · qmk ,

(3)

i denotes the regression coeﬃcient associated with
where δ··
im is the regression coeﬃcient for the
resource i and δ··
interaction between resources i and m. Similar models are
used for Yhk , Dhk , and Vhk .
The above relationships between the impact measures
and the resource distributions ought to be determined
a priori of implementing a cross-regional scenario (see
Section 3). Here, we consider each region k as the initial
outbreak region. We assume, however, that as the pandemic
evolves, the disease infectivity will naturally subside. Hence,
the regression equations need to be re-estimated at every new
outbreak epoch, for each region k ∈ C n , using the singleregion simulation models, where each simulation must be
initialized to the current outbreak status in region k in
the cross-regional simulation. As an alternative to using
a computationally burdensome approach of re-estimating
the regression equations, a modeler may choose to use a
certain decay factor αn [76] to adjust the estimates of the
regional impact measures at every nth outbreak epoch, in the
following way:

Xhnj = αn Xh j ,

Yhnj = αn Yh j ,

Dhn j = αn Dh j ,

Vhnj = αn Vh j .

(4)

In addition, we use the following regression model to
estimate the probability of pandemic spread from aﬀected
region l to unaﬀected region k, as a function of resources
allocated to region l, which, in turn, impact the number of
outgoing infectious travelers from the region:
plk = γlk0 +



γlki · qil +

i∈R



γlkim · qil · qml ,

i,m∈R
i=
/m

(5)

i denotes the regression coeﬃcient associated with
where γ··
im is the regression coeﬃcient associated with
resource i, γ··
0 represents the
interaction between resources i and m, and γ··
intercept. Consequently, the total outbreakprobability for
unaﬀected region k can be found as pk = l∈Bn plk . As in
the case of the impact measures, the estimates of the regional
outbreak probabilities need to be progressively re-estimated
or adjusted using a scheme similar to (4), as follows:

pkn = αn pk .

(6)
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Finally, we calculate the total cost of an outbreak in
region k at the nth decision epoch as follows:
TCnk

=


h∈H

+

n
(mh + wh )Xhk


h∈H

+


h∈H

n
wh · Yhk

+


h∈H

n
wh · Dhk

(7)

n
wh · Vhk
,

where mh is total medical cost of an infected case in age group
h over his/her disease period, wh is total cost of lost wages of
an infected case in age group h over his/her disease period, wh
is cost of lost lifetime wages of a deceased case in age group
h, and wh is daily cost of lost wages of a non-infected case in
age group h who complies with quarantine.
The model. The optimization model has the following form.
Minimize



TCnj q1 j , q2 j , . . . , qr j
+


s∈C n

subject to

qi j +


s∈C n







TCns q1s , q2s , . . . , qrs · psn
(8)
qis · psn ≤ Qin

∀i ∈ R,

qi j , qis ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ R.
The first term of the objective function represents the
total cost of the new outbreak j, estimated at the nth
outbreak epoch, based on the actual resource distribution
{q1 j , q2 j , . . . , qr j } (see (7)). The second term represents the
total expected cost of outbreaks in currently unaﬀected
regions, based on the virtual distributions {q1s , q2s , . . . , qrs }
(7) and the regional outbreak probabilities psn (6). The set
of constraints assures that for each resource i, the total
quantity allocated (current and virtual, both nonnegative)
does not exceed the total resource availability at the nth
decision epoch. Note that both the objective function and
the availability constraints are nonlinear in the decision
variables.
2.4. Solution Algorithm. The solution algorithm for our
dynamic predictive simulation optimization (DPO) model is
given below.
(1) Estimate regression equations for each region using
the single-region simulation model.
(2) Begin the cross-regional simulation model.
(3) Initialize the sets of regions: An = ∅, Bn = ∅, C n =
S.
(4) Select randomly the initial outbreak region j. Set n =
1.
(5) Update sets of regions: Bn ← Bn ∪ { j } and C n ← C n \
{ j }.
(6) Solve the resource distribution model for region j.
Update the total resource availabilities.
(7) If Bn =
/ ∅, do step 8. Else, do step 10.

(8)
(a) For each ongoing region, implement a next day
run of its single-region simulation.
(b) Check the containment status of each ongoing
region. Update sets An and Bn , if needed.
(c) For each unaﬀected region, calculate its outbreak probability.
(d) Based on the outbreak probability values, determine if there is a new outbreak region(s) j.
If there is no new outbreak(s), go to step 7.
Otherwise, go to step 9.
(9) For each new outbreak region j,
(a) Increment n ← n + 1.
(b) Update sets Bn ← Bn ∪ { j } and C n ← C n \ { j }.
(c) Re-estimate regression equations for each
region k ∈ Bn ∪ C n using the single-region
simulations, where each simulation is initialized
to the current outbreak status in the region
(alternatively, use (4) and (6)).
(d) Solve the resource distribution model for region
j.
(e) Update the total resource availabilities.
(10) Calculate the total cost for each contained region and
update the overall pandemic cost.

3. Testbed Illustration
To illustrate the use of our methodology, we present a
sample H5N1 outbreak scenario including four counties
in Fla, USA: Hillsborough, Miami Dade, Duval, and Leon,
with populations of 1.0, 2.2, 0.8, and 0.25 million people,
respectively. A basic unit of time for population and disease
dynamics models was taken to be Δt = 1 hour. Regional
simulations were run for a period (up to 180 days) until the
daily infection rate approached near zero (see Section 3.3).
Below, we present the details on selecting model parameter
values. Most of the testbed data can be found in the
supplement [77].
3.1. Parameter Values for Population and Disease Dynamics
Models. Demographic and social dynamics data for each
region [77] were extracted from the U.S. Census [78] and
the National Household Travel Survey [79]. Daily (hourly)
schedules [77] were adopted from [53].
Each infected person was assigned a daily travel probability of 0.24% [79], of which 7% was by air and 93%
by land. The probabilities of travel among the four regions
were calculated using traﬃc volume data [80–83], see
Table 1. Infection detection probabilities for border control
for symptomatic cases were assumed to be 95% and 90%, for
air and land, respectively [84].
The instantaneous force of infection applied to contact i
at time t ((1), [57]) was modeled as




λi (t) = − ln 1 − pi (t) ,

where pi (t) = αi − δθi (t),

(9)
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Table 1: Interregional travel probabilities.
Origin\Destination
Hillsborough
Miami D.
Duval
Leon

Interregional Travel Probability
Hillsborough Miami D. Duval
0.00
0.60
0.27
0.74
0.00
0.16
0.61
0.29
0.00
0.52
0.31
0.17

Leon
0.13
0.10
0.10
0.00

3.3. Parameters of Mitigation. Mitigation resources included
stockpiles of vaccines and antiviral and administration
capacities (Section 3.4). A 24-hour delay was assumed for
deployment of resources and filed responders [59].

Table 2: Instantaneous infection probabilities.
Age group
αi

0–5
0.156

6–19
0.106

20–29
0.205

31–65
0.195

66–99
0.344

Table 3: Mortality probabilities for diﬀerent age groups.
Age group
0–19
20–64
65+

% HRC
6.4
14.4
40.0

% Mortality in HRC
9.0
40.9
34.4

no interventions implemented (the baseline scenario) [33].
Historically, R0 values for PI ranged between 1.4 and 3.9 [37,
43]. To attain similar values, we calibrated the hourly contact
rates of mixing groups [77] (original rates were adopted from
[46]). For the four regions, the average baseline value of R0
was 2.54, which represented a high transmissibility scenario.
The values of regional baseline IAR averaged 0.538.

μi
0.007
0.069
0.162

where αi is the age-dependent base instantaneous infection
probability of contact i, θi (t) is her status of vaccination at
time t (0 or 1), and δ is the vaccine eﬃcacy, measured as
the reduction in the base instantaneous infection probability
(achieved after 10 days [61]).
The values of age-dependent base instantaneous infection probabilities were adopted from [46] (see Table 2). The
disease natural history included a latent period of 29 hours
(1.21 days), an incubation period of 46 hours (1.92 days),
an infectiousness period from 29 to 127 hours (1.21 to 5.29
days), and a period leading to health outcome from 127 to
240 hours (5.29 to 10 days) [85].
Base mortality probabilities (μi in (2)) were found using
the statistics recommended by the Working Group on Pandemic Preparedness and Influenza Response [52]. This data
shows the percentage of mortality for age-based high-risk
cases (HRC) (Table 3, columns 1–3). Mortality probabilities
(column 4) were estimated under the assumption that highrisk cases are expected to account for 85% of the total
number of fatalities, for each age group [52].
3.2. Calibration of the Single-Region Models. Single-region
simulation models were calibrated using two common
measures of pandemic severity [35, 45, 46]: the basic
reproduction number (R0 ) and the infection attack rate
(IAR). R0 is defined as the average number of secondary
infections produced by a typical infected case in a totally
susceptible population. IAR is defined as the ratio of the
total number of infections over the pandemic period to
the size of the initial susceptible population. To determine
R0 , all infected cases inside the simulation were classified
by generation of infection, as in [33, 43]. The value of R0
was calculated as the average reproduction number of a
typical generation in the early stage of the pandemic, with

PHI. The vaccination risk group included healthcare
providers [66], and individuals younger than 5 years (excluding younger than 12 months old) and older than 65 years
[60]. The risk group for antiviral included symptomatic
individuals below 15 years and above 55 years [60, 86].
The eﬃcacy levels for the vaccine (δ in (9)) and antiviral
(τ in (2)) were assumed to be 40% [44, 87] and 70%,
respectively. We did not consider the use of antiviral for
a mass prophylactic reduction of infection susceptibility
due to the limited antiviral availability [9] and the risk of
emergence of antiviral resistant transmissible virus strains
[26]. We assumed a 90% target population conformance for
both vaccination and antiviral treatment [64]. The immunity
development period for the vaccine was taken as 10 days [61].
NPI. A version of the CDC guidance for quarantine and
isolation for Category 5 was implemented (Section 2.2.4,
[51]). Once the reported CFR value had reached 1.0%, the
following policy was declared and remained in eﬀect for 14
days [51]: (i) individuals below a certain age ξ (22 years)
stayed at home during the entire policy duration, (ii) of the
remaining population, a certain proportion φ [88] stayed at
home and was allowed a one-hour leave, every three days,
to buy essential supplies, and (iii) the remaining (1 − φ)
noncompliant proportion followed a regular schedule. All
testbed scenarios considered the quarantine conformance
level φ equal to 80% [54].
An outbreak was considered contained, if the daily infection rate did not exceed five cases, for seven consecutive days.
Once contained, a region was simulated for an additional 10
days for accurate estimation of the pandemic statistics. A 25
statistical design of experiment [89] was used to estimate the
regression coeﬃcient values of the significant decision factors
and their interactions (see Section 2.3; the values of adjusted
R2 ranged from 96.36% to 99.97%).
The simulation code was developed using C++. The running time for a cross-regional simulation replicate involving
over four million inhabitants was between 17 and 26 minutes
(depending on the initial outbreak region, with a total of 150
replicates) on a Pentium 3.40 GHz with 4.0 GB of RAM.
3.4. Comparison of DPO and Myopic Strategies. The performance of the DPO and myopic policies is compared at
diﬀerent levels of resource availability.
Table 4 summarizes the total vaccine and antiviral
requirements for each region, based on the composition of

8

Influenza Research and Treatment
Table 4: Total and regional resource requirements.

Region (population)
Resource
Vaccine stockpile
Antiviral stockpile
No. antiv. nurses
No. vacc. nurses

Hillsb.
(1,007,916)

Miami D.
(2,209,702)

305,036
415,294
650
1,059

679,181
749,058
1,104
2,358

Table 5: Values of pandemic impact measures (societal and
economic costs).
Pandemic impact measure (age group, years)
Average cost of lost lifetime productivity of a
deceased case (0–19)
Average cost of lost lifetime productivity of a
deceased case (20–64)
Average cost of lost lifetime productivity of a
deceased case (65–99)
Average cost of lost productivity and medical
expenses of a recovered/deceased case (0–19)
Average cost of lost productivity and medical
expenses of a recovered/deceased case (20–64)
Average cost of lost productivity and medical
expenses of a recovered/deceased case (65–99)
Average daily cost of lost productivity of a
non-infected quarantined case (20–99)

Value US$
$1,336,347.86
$1,370,987.28
$98,959.24
$5,078.48
$10,466.68
$11,566.09
$432.54

Table 6: Average number of regional outbreaks for DPO and
myopic policies.

Policy
DPO
Myopic

20%
1.75
2.40

Total resource availability
50%
80%
1.66
1.44
1.77
1.50

theregional risk groups (see Section 3.3). Table 5 shows the
per capita costs of lost productivity and medical expenses,
which were adopted from [52] and adjusted for inflation for
the year of 2010 [90].
Comparison of the two strategies is done at the levels of
20%, 50%, and 80% of the total resource requirement shown
in Table 4. Figures 6(a) and 6(b) show the policy comparison
in the form of the 95% confidence intervals (CI) for the
average number of infected and deceased, respectively.
Figure 7 also shows the policy comparison using the 95%
CI for the average total pandemic cost, calculated using the
pandemic statistics, and the per capita costs from Table 5.
For illustrative purposes, we also show the average number
of regional outbreaks, for each policy, at diﬀerent levels of
resource availability, in the testbed scenario involving four
regions, with the Hillsborough as the initial outbreak region
(Table 6).

Resource requirements by region
Duval
Leon
(852,168)
(248,761)
241,522
460,393
786
839

76,007
105,307
166
264

Total
(4,318,547)
1,301,745
1,730,052
2,706
4,520

It can be observed that the values of all impact measures
exhibit a downward trend, for both DPO and myopic
policies, as the total resource availability increases from 20%
to 80%.
An increased total resource availability not only helps
alleviating the pandemic impact inside the ongoing regions
but also reduces the probability of spread to the unaﬀected
regions. For both policies, as the total resource availability
approaches the total resource requirement (starting from
approximately 60%), the impact numbers show a converging
behavior, whereby the marginal utility of additional resource
availability diminishes. This behavior can be explained by
noting that the total resource requirements were determined
assuming the worst case scenario when all (four) regions
would be aﬀected and ought to provided with enough
resources to cover their respective regional populations at
risk. It can also be seen that on average, the DPO policy
outperforms the myopic approach at all levels, which can
attest to a more eﬃcient resource utilization achieved by
the DPO policy (see also Table 6). The diﬀerence in the
policy performance is particularly noticeable at the lower
levels of resource availability, and it gradually diminishes, as
the resource availability increases and becomes closer to be
suﬃcient to cover the entire populations at risk in all regions.
It can also be noted that the variability in the performance of
the DPO strategy is generally smaller than that of the myopic
policy. In general, for both strategies, the performance
variability decreases with higher availability of resources.
3.5. Sensitivity Analysis. In this section, we assess the
marginal impact of variability of some of the critical factors.
The impact was measured separately by the change in the
total pandemic cost and the number of deaths (averaged
over multiple replicates), resulting from a unit change
in a decision factor value, one factor at a time. Factors
under consideration included: (i) antiviral eﬃcacy, (ii) social
distancing conformance, and (iii) CDC response delay. We
have used all four regions, separately, as initial outbreak
regions for each type of sensitivity analysis. The results
(patterns) were rather similar. Due to limited space, we have
opted to show the results for only one initial region, chosen
arbitrarily, for each of the three types of sensitivity studies.
While Duval County was selected as the initial outbreak
region to show the sensitivity results on antiviral eﬃcacy,
Hillsborough and Miami Dade were used as the initial
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Figure 6: Comparison of DPO and myopic policies (average number infected 6(a) and deaths 6(b)).

It can be noted that the performance of both policies is
somewhat identical for low antiviral eﬃcacy (between 0%
and 30%). However, the performance of the DPO policy
improves consistently as τ increases which can be attributed
to a more discretionary allocation of the antiviral stockpile
by the DPO policy.

170
95% CI for average total cost ($B)

150.48
145
120
105.97
95

96.05
83.18

regions to show the results on, respectively, social distancing
conformance and CDC response delay.

3.5.2. Social Distancing Conformance. Reduction of the contact intensity through quarantine and social distancing has
proven to be one of the most eﬀective containment measures,
especially in the early stages of the pandemic [27, 30, 31, 41].
Figure 9 shows the sensitivity of the average total cost
and average total deaths to the social distancing conformance
ranging between 60% and 80%. We observed that for both
impact measures, the DPO policy demonstrated a better
performance with the diﬀerence ranging from $3B to $26B
in the total cost and from 1,400 to 20,000 in the number of
fatalities. The biggest diﬀerence in performance was achieved
at the lower-to-medium levels of conformance (between 65%
and 72%). As the conformance level approached 80%, the
dominating impact of social distancing masked the eﬀect of
better utilization of vaccines and antivirals achieved by the
DPO strategy.

3.5.1. Antiviral Eﬃcacy. Figure 8 depicts the sensitivity of
the average total cost and average total deaths to antiviral
eﬃcacy values between 0% and 80%. As expected, for both
policies, the curves for the average number of deaths exhibit
a decreasing trend which is almost linear for the values of τ
between 0% and 40%. As the value of τ approaches 70%, the
curves start exhibit a converging behavior. The curves for the
average total pandemic cost exhibit a similar pattern for both
policies.

3.5.3. CDC Response Delay. The CDC response delay corresponds to the interval of time from the moment an outbreak
is detected to a complete deployment of mitigation resources.
Depending on the disease infectivity, CDC response delay
may represent one of the most critical factors in the
mitigation process.
Figure 10 shows how the performance of both policies
was significantly impacted by this factor. The DPO policy
showed a uniformly better performance with the diﬀerence

70
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62.49
45
40.19
20

38.64 41.94
28.64 29.76

20
50
80
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Figure 7: DPO versus myopic (total cost).
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Figure 9: Sensitivity analysis for quarantine conformance.

ranging between $3B to $4B in the average total cost, and
between 800 to 1,800 in the average number of mortalities,
over the range (24–72 hours) of the response delay that
we examined. For both policies, there was no significant

diﬀerence when the delay was between 24 and 48 hours.
However, for the delay values exceeding 48 hours, the
average number of deaths and total cost increased at a high
rate.
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Figure 10: Sensitivity analysis for CDC response delay.

4. Conclusions
As recently pointed by the IOM, the existing models for PI
mitigation fall short of providing dynamic decision support
which would incorporate “the costs and benefits of intervention” [50]. In this paper, we present a large-scale simulation
optimization model which is attempted at filling this gap.
The model supports dynamic predictive resource distribution over a network of regions exposed to the pandemic.
The model aims to balance both the ongoing and potential
outbreak impact, which is measured in terms of morbidity,
mortality, and social distancing, translated into the cost
of lost productivity and medical expenses. The model was
calibrated using historic pandemic data and compared to the
myopic strategy, using a sample outbreak in Fla, USA, with
over 4 million inhabitants.
Summary of the main results. In the testbed scenario, for
both strategies, the marginal utility of additional resource
availability was found to be diminishing, as the total resource
availability approached the total requirement.
In the testbed scenario, the DPO strategy on average
outperformed the myopic policy. As opposed to the DPO
strategy, the myopic policy is reactive, rather than predictive,
as it allocates resources regardless of the remaining availability and the overall cross-regional pandemic status. In
contrast, the DPO model distributes resources trying to balance the impact of actual outbreaks and the expected impact
of potential outbreaks. It does so by exploiting regionspecific eﬀectiveness of mitigation resources and dynamic
reassessment of pandemic spread probabilities, using a set
of regression submodels. Hence, we believe that in scenarios
involving regions with a more heterogeneous demographics,

the DPO policy will likely to perform even better and with
less variability than the myopic strategy. We also note that the
diﬀerence in the model performance was particularly noticeable at lower levels of resource availability, which is in accordance with a higher marginal utility of additional availability
at that levels. We thus believe that the DPO model can be
particularly useful in scenarios with very limited resources.
Contributions of the paper. The simulation optimization
methodology presented in this paper is one of the first
attempts to oﬀer dynamic predictive decision support for
pandemic mitigation, which incorporates measures of societal and economic costs. Our comparison study of the DPO
versus myopic cross-regional resource distribution is also
novel. Additionally, our simulation model represents one
of the first of its kind in considering a broader range of
social behavioral aspects, including vaccination and antiviral
treatment conformance. The simulation features a flexible
design which can be particularized to a broader range of PHI
and NPI and even more granular mixing groups.
We also developed a decision-aid simulator which is
made available to the general public through our web site
at http://imse.eng.usf.edu/pandemics.aspx. The tool is intended to assist public health decision makers in implementing what-if analysis for assessment of mitigation options
and development of policy guidelines. Examples of such
guidelines include vaccine and antiviral risk groups, social
distancing policies (e.g., thresholds for declaration/lifting
and closure options), and travel restrictions.
Limitations of the model. Lack of reliable data prevented
us from considering geo-spatial aspects of mixing group
formation. We also did not consider the impact of public
education and the use of personal protective measures (e.g.,
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face masks) on transmission, again due to a lack of eﬀectiveness data [91]. We did not study the marginal eﬀectiveness
of individual resources due to a considerable uncertainty
about the transmissibility of an emerging pandemic virus
and eﬃcacy of vaccine and antiviral. For the same reason, the
vaccine and antiviral risk groups considered in the testbed
can be adjusted, as diﬀerent prioritization schemes have been
suggested. The form of social distancing implemented in
the testbed can also be modified as a variety of schemes
can be found in the literature, including those based on
geographical and social targeting. Eﬀectiveness of these
approaches is substantially influenced by the compliance
factor, for which limited accurate data support exists. It
will thus be vital to gather the most detailed data on the
epidemiology of a new virus and the population dynamics
early in the evolution of a pandemic, and expeditiously
analyze the data to adjust the interventions accordingly.
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